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THE CASE FOR COOPERATIVE
TERRITORIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY

LynnM. LoPucki*
"[I]t seems unrealistic to think that universalism will be accepted absent
roughly similar laws." -Jay L. Westbrook (1991)1
INTRODUCTION

Universalism - the idea that a multinational debtor's "home
country" should have worldwide jurisdiction over its bankruptcy has long had tremendous appeal to bankruptcy professionals. Yet, the
international community repeatedly has refused to adopt conventions
that would make universalism a reality. In an article published last
year, I proposed an explanation.2 Universalism can work only in a
world with essentially uniform laws governing bankruptcy �nd priority
among creditors -a world that does not yet exist.
Because it is impossible to fix the location of a multinational com
pany in a global economy, the introduction of universalism in current
world circumstances would give each multinational company a choice
of countries in which to file. By its choice, the company could choose
not only the procedure for its bankruptcy, but also the substantive
rights its creditors would have. Universalism would require other na
tions to recognize the effects of that strategic choice. Given the huge
amounts of money potentially at stake, governments rightly fear that
opportunism would run rampant.3
Universalists insist that the requirement that bankruptcies occur in
the "home country" of the multinational company would prevent fo
rum shopping. They premise their defense of universalism on the as
sumption that each multinational company would have one home
country and that everyone could know in advance which it was.4 Yet,
* Security Pacific Bank Professor of Law, UCLA Law School. lopucki@Iaw.ucla.edu.
A.B. 1965, J.D. 1967, University of Michigan; LL.M. 1970, Harvard. - Ed. I thank Dan
Busse!, Frances Foster, Mitu Gulati, and Elizabeth Warren for comments on earlier drafts.

1. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism In Global Insolvencies: Choice of
Law and Choice ofFomm, 65 AM. BANKR. LJ. 457, 485 (1991).
2 See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post
Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999).

3 . See id. at 723-25.
98

4. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism,
MICH. L. REv. 2177, 2199 (2000) ("Under universalism, the creditor can restrict this in-
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no universalist writer has been able to define "home country" with any
specificity or to describe how their system reliably could determine it.
In this essay, I again raise the three specific questions regarding
home countries that universalists seem unable to answer. First, when
the principal assets, operations, headquarters, and place of incorpora
tion are in different countries, which is the "home country"? Second,
does "home country" refer to the home country of a corporate group
or does each corporation in the group have its own "home country"?
Third, what rules will govern the inevitable changes in the "home
country" that occur after credit has been extended? The inability of
the two prominent universalists writing in this symposium to answer
these questions, suggests that they are, indeed, unanswerable.
I agree with Professor Westbrook5 that it is likely that the global
ization of business eventually will harmonize the now-divergent debt
collection and insolvency systems of the countries of the world, mak
ing conditions ripe for universalism.6 That may take decades, how
ever, or even centuries. The issue is what to do while we are waiting
for the "new world" society - essentially, a world government - to
arrive.7 I believe it is to continue to apply principles of sovereignty territoriality. Westbrook believes it is for countries - and even indi
vidual judges - to begin implementing universalist principles on a
piecemeal basis today.8
Responding to the universalist ideal, some bankruptcy judges al
ready surrender assets to "home country" courts that will distribute
them differently. Westbrook applauds these surrenders as steps along
the road to universalism,9 and he attempts to excuse the injustice to
the individual creditors involved by noting that, if the courts of other
nations did the same, there might be a "Rough Wash" in which all na-

quiry to the law of one country (the debtor's home country) . . . . ). But see infra text ac
companying note 65 (Professor Westbrook, the leading universalist, acknowledging that in
some cases creditors will have to assume that more than one country might be the debtor's
home country).
5. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2276, 2292-97 (2000 ) (arguing that the bankruptcy systems of the world will con
verge over an unspecified period of time).
"

6. Professor Westbrook seems to me to make too much of this agreement. First,
whether the conditions will ever be ripe for world government is mere speculation on both
our parts. Second, I do not agree with Westbrook that even the inevitability of a particular
system existing in such a distant, speculative future is a justification for adopting aspects of
that system today. Half a loaf is usually better than none, but half a system is usually just a
mess.
7. The term is Westbrook's. See id. at2276.
8. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2323 n. 197 (praising cases in which bankruptcy courts
have surrendered assets for distribution under foreign law that differed from that of the fo
rum).
9 . See id. at 23 19 ("I am convinced that modified universalism is the best transitional
rule, because it moves us in the right direction - toward true universalism . . . . ).
"
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tions received about as much value as they gave.10 Westbrook's analy
sis ignores that it is creditors, not nations, that have entitlements in
bankruptcy estates. The creditor that goes unpaid because its country
surrenders the assets to a foreign court for distribution according to
the foreign country's laws is not consoled by the fact that some other
creditor of the same nationality received a windfall from that foreign
court in another case.
Part I of this Essay describes the current, territorial system for in
ternational bankruptcy and the potential for international cooperation
within it. Part II explains the significance of the universalists' inability
to answer the three questions posed above, and adds a fourth. Part III
responds to the attacks that Professors Guzman and Westbrook make
on territoriality, and Part IV considers Professor Rasmussen's
thought-provoking contractualist approach to international insol
vency. Part V concludes that territoriality continues to provide the
soundest basis for international cooperation in present world circum
stances and for the reasonably foreseeable future.
I.

TERRITORIALITY

Territoriality - the idea that each country has the exclusive right
to govern within its borders11 - is such a basic principle of interna
tional law that it often goes unnoticed. It is the default rule in every
substantive area of law, including constitutional law, taxation, trade
marks, industrial regulation, debt collection, and bankruptcy.12 When
applied to the bankruptcy of a multinational company, territoriality
means that the bankruptcy courts of a country have jurisdiction over
those portions of the company that are within its borders and not
those portions that are outside them. Some nations claim "extraterri
torial effect" for their bankruptcy systems, but they recognize that absent treaties or conventions to the contrary - they can enforce their
laws only against assets or persons within their own borders.13 With
respect to bankruptcy, such treaties and conventions are virtually non-

10. See Westbrook, supra note 1, at 465 ("The central argument for the Rough Wash is
that a universalist rule will roughly even out benefits and losses for local creditors, who will
gain enough from foreign deference to the local forum in one case to balance any loss from
local deference to the foreign forum in another.").
11. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 105-22 (5th
ed. 1998); MARK w. JAN IS, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONA L LAW 322-23 (3d ed. 1999).
12 See, e.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRA DEMA RKS AND UN FA IR
COMPETITION§ 29:1 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that international trademark law is "territorial").
13. But see Kent Anderson, The Cross-Border Insolvency Paradigm: A Defense of the
Modified Universal Approach Considering the Japanese Experience, 21 U. PA . J. INT'L
ECON. L. (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 6, on file with author) (noting that even though
extraterritorial bankruptcy laws are in many cases "mere overreaching that has no actual
foreign impact" such laws nevertheless allow for the possibility of enforcement by willing
countries).
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existent. Territoriality is currently the international law of bank
ruptcy.14
Most multinational companies have responded to territoriality by
placing their holdings in each country in a separate corporation,
formed under local law. Some of these local subsidiaries are free
standing, self-sufficient businesses that the local country can reorgan
ize or liquidate in accordance with local law. But other local subsidi
aries may own only the local assets of an integrated, international
business. And, in yet other cases, a foreign entity may own local assets
directly. In these latter two circumstances, international cooperation
may be needed to reorganize the business or liquidate its assets for the
best price.
In a territorial system, the necessary international cooperation
takes place in each case. That is, "parallel" bankruptcy proceedings
are initiated in each country in which the corporate group has substan
tial assets. Each court appoints a "representative" for the estate of
each entity filing in its jurisdiction. Those representatives then negoti
ate a solution to the debtor's financial problems. If the estates are
worth more in combination than they are separately, it will be in the
interests of the representatives to combine them.
Problems may arise because the bankruptcy laws of particular
countries do not authorize cooperation, even when cooperation would
increase the value of the local estate. But a country that will not
authorize cooperation on a limited territorial basis will certainly not
do so on the much more extensive basis of universalism. As a conse
quence, these deficiencies in authorization in no way bolster the case
for universalism.15
As the international bankruptcy system currently operates, the ap
plication of territorial principles to multinational cases presents no se
rious problems. When the debtor's financial problems are confined to
the entities located in a single country, the distressed entity or entities
reorganize or liquidate in that country, and the foreign entities are un
affected. When a multinational company's financial problems extend
across borders, each financially distressed entity files for bankruptcy in
each country where it has significant assets. The effect is to create at
least one bankruptcy estate in each country. The representatives of
those estates negotiate and obtain court approval of an agreement
("protocol") that provides the terms for cooperation in the particular

14. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communications, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 253 2 (1996) (acknowledging that, as between universalism and ter
ritoriality, territoriality is "the one most often applied").
15. The reasons why even a universalist system would require ex post cooperation
among countries are discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 19-20 and in note 95.
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case.16 In theory, the representatives of a multinational company's es
tates might fail to agree on a protocol. But territoriality's detractors,
as yet, offer no examples of cases in which that has occurred.
The representatives negotiate in light of what would happen if they
do not reach an agreement. Absent an agreement, the assets in each
country would be reorganized or liquidated and the proceeds distrib
uted in accord with the laws of that country. For example, assume that
a financially distressed entity has assets in the United States and
Canada. The entity would file in both countries, an estate would be
created in each, and the courts of each country would appoint a repre
sentative of the estate in that country. Unless the representatives
agreed otherwise, the U.S. assets would be distributed in accord with
U.S. law and the Canadian assets would be distributed in accord with
Canadian law. In this context, "U.S. law" would include U.S. conflicts
rules, but bankruptcy conflict rules generally direct that the court look
to local law in the distribution of a bankruptcy estate.17 The result is
that the priority rules of the country where an asset is located typically
determine the key issue in any bankruptcy case - who shares in the
asset and in what proportion.
The system of territoriality described here is not one that I pro
pose. It is the system currently operating in the world. Thus, it is the
system that should be compared to the form of modified universalism
that Westbrook would implement without waiting for the adoption of
an international convention.18
II.

UNIVERSALISM

"Universalism" is the term ordinarily used to refer to a world
bankruptcy system in which a single court - that of the debtor's
"home country" - would have jurisdiction over a debtor's assets,
wherever located, and distribute them in accordance with the law of
that country. The term "pure universalism" is used to refer to a uni
versalist system in which law enforcement officers in all countries are
bound to enforce the orders of the court of the home country. Even
the strongest advocates of universalism realize that this pure form of

16. The protocol and implementing court order from the Maxwell Communications
Corporation bankruptcy are reprinted in JACOB s. ZIEGEL, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 636 (1994).
17. See, e.g., 11U.S.C.§304(c){4) {1994) (authorizing the turnover ofU. S. assets to for
eign bankruptcy proceedings "consistent with . . . distribution of proceeds of such estate sub
stantially in accordance with the order prescribed by [the United States Bankruptcy
Code]").
18. Westbrook seems to agree that this is the appropriate comparison. See Westbrook,
note 5, at 2307-08 {"I will therefore compare theoretical, future universalism as I have
described it above with Professor LoPucki's theoretical, 'conventionalized' territorialism as
presented in his widely read article in the Cornell Law Review. I will then compare modi
fied universalism with the current system of territorialism.").

supra
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universalism is so contrary to prevailing notions of sovereignty as to be
unthinkable in current world circumstances.19 No country will permit
foreign courts to make and directly enforce orders within its borders.
In the most common use of the term "universalism," the user contem
plates that local courts in each affected country will be obligated by
local law or international convention to enforce orders of the home
country court. As I have put it elsewhere, "one court plays the tune,
and everyone else dances."20 Thus, universalism is not a single-court
system, but merely a dominant-court system.
The term "modified universalism" refers to yet a looser form of
control. Under modified universalism, the local courts each have
some degree of freedom to decide whether compliance with requests
emanating from the home country is appropriate.21 The legal standard
might be that compliance will not alter the entitlements of the parties
or that it will not offend the public policy of the complying country.
Modified universalism under the first of these two possible standards
- the strain adopted by the United States in Bankruptcy Code section
304 - is virtually indistinguishable from territoriality. That is, all dis
tributions from local assets are made in accord with the law of the
place where the asset is located at the time of bankruptcy. That distri
bution can be made by a foreign court, but only with the express ac
quiescence of the local court in the particular case.
A.

Westbrook's Proposals

Professor Westbrook advocates universalism in a shot-gun fashion.
That is, he advocates a wide variety of universalist systems, whose
adoptions are incompatible with one another. They include a single
international bankruptcy law administered by a new system of interna
tional commercial courts,22 a single international bankruptcy law
enforced by national courts,23 national bankruptcy laws enforced by
international courts,24 and national laws enforced by national

19. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 TEX. lNT'L L.J. 27, 28 n.4
{"There is also the notion of 'unity,' which means that one court administers all assets, but
that notion is so far from contemporary reality that it is not really part of the working hy
pothesis of present scholars.").
20. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 699.
21. Those requests might be from the court or from a representative of the estate.
22. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2309 (referring to "a world with a universalist con
vention establishing one bankruptcy law and one court system to administer it"); id. at 2293
("[A] single court system, applying a single set of choice-of-law rules with some hope of con
sistency, would produce a far higher level of predictability in commercial transactions than
we now have."); id. at 2294 n.87 (referring to "international courts devoted to bankrupt
cies").
23. See id. at 2317 {advocating for " Single Law, National Courts").
24. See id. at 23 1 5 {advocating for " Single Court, National Laws").

2222

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:2216

courts.25 He advocates pure universalism,26 traditional universalism27
and modified universalism.28 He advocates an international conven
tion to implement universalism, but does not make it a prerequisite to
an attempt to implement any particular type of universalism.29 He
suggests that each of these reforms might be made applicable to only
"large" multinational companies, without offering a definition of
large.30 In an earlier article, he suggested that a "special," non
universalist rule would apply to the claims of "unsophisticated credi
tors," but has not said what that rule would be.31
His proposals that require the world to agree on a single law would
necessitate revision of not only the bankruptcy laws of all nations, but
also the laws governing creditor priority, setoff, and security interests.
In addition, each country would have to revise its laws governing debt
collection in the absence of bankruptcy to make them compatible with
the new bankruptcy law. In the absence of a world government, once
such a universal bankruptcy law was adopted, it would be difficult to
change. Given the low level of experience that the world has with al
ternative bankruptcy regimes, such a terminal project seems prema
ture. But if such a law were adopted, it would create the conditions
necessary for universalism to work.
Westbrook does not explain how the new network of international
bankruptcy courts he proposes would differ from the national courts
they would replace, or what advantage they would offer over the cur
rent system of national courts. Accordingly, I do not attempt to ad
dress that aspect of his proposals.
The fault with Westbrook's proposal to implement modified uni
versalism without an international convention - discussed in the in
troduction - is already evident in the operation of the system today.
The acts of individual judges in surrendering assets to other courts that

25. See id. at 2292 (advocating "a uniform set of choice-of-law rules and choice-of-forum
rules" as an alternative to "a single international bankruptcy law and a single international
bankruptcy court system").
26. See id. at 2293-94 (referring to his "single court system").
27. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
28. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2300 ("Modified universalism is the approach that I
have suggested as an interint or transitional solution.").
29. See id. at 2283 (describing the goal of his essay as "elaborating the best global bank
ruptcy system that might be created by a multinational convention on this subject").
30. See id. at 2298-99 ("Limited application of a universalist regime only to large multi
nationals would permit local policies to be applied to local enterprises.").
31. See Donald T. Trautman, Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Emmanuel Gaillard, Four
Models for International Bankruptcy, 41 AM. BANKR. L.J. 573, 624 (1991) ("If cases should
arise where the reasonable expectations of unsophisticated creditors (in the United States,
'the little old lady in tennis shoes') might suffer unfairly, there is no reason a special rule
cannot be applied in such cases.").
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will distribute them differently frustrate entitlements in, and reduce
the predictability of, a system that remains principally territorial.
Professor Westbrook responds that no one is "cheated" by such
surrenders of assets because they are merely a "transnational solution
to a transnational bankruptcy."32 I take him to mean that be believes
creditors of a multinational company should anticipate a universalist
distribution of assets and so should not complain when they get one.
But the surrenders of assets necessary to achieve such a "transnational
solution" are prohibited by reasonably clear language in the United
States Bankruptcy Code33 and the world community consistently has
refused to provide for them by convention.34 They seldom occur. As a
result, there is no reason for creditors to anticipate them. To put it
concretely, the workers in a Chrysler plant in Detroit do not expect to
have to claim their wages and benefits in a German bankruptcy court
and they do not expect the German law of creditor priorities to de
termine whether they will be paid. Yet that is precisely what would
happen if Daimler Chrysler filed bankruptcy in Germany and a uni
versalist United States Bankruptcy judge decided to surrender the as
sets of Chrysler to the German court.
The remainder of this Part addresses the proposals by Westbrook,
Guzman, and others for the system generally understood to be "uni
versalist" - one in which the national court of the multinational's
home country implements the national bankruptcy law of that coun
try. My assertion that universalists are unable to specify a workable
definition of "home country" includes the assertion that they cannot
do so by convention. That is not merely because they cannot agree on
an answer, but rather, because no answer could render universalism
workable.
B.

The Questions Universalists Cannot Answer

Nearly all of the putative advantages of universalism depend on
the assumption that each multinational company has a single home
country that will not change over time. The arguments for univer
salism fail because no universalist scholar has yet proposed a workable

32 See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2322. The passage reads: "Indeed, Professor
LoPucki's notion that local creditors are somehow cheated of vested rights by a transna
tional solution to a transnational bankruptcy lies at the heart of our disagreement." Id.
33. Section 304(c) of the U.S. bankruptcy code provides that "in determining whether to
order turnover of property of the estate, or the proceeds of such property, to [a] foreign rep
resentative" the action taken shall be "consistent with . . . distribution of proceeds of such
estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by [the U.S. bankruptcy code]."
11 U.S.C. §304(b)(2) and (c)(4).
34. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 4, at 2184 ("Despite the near-unanimous support of
the academic community, policymakers have chosen not to adopt universalism.").
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test or method for identifying that country. Without such a method,
universalism cannot be implemented.
Universalism cannot operate without the ability to identify a home
country for each multinational company for three reasons. First, the
home country's law will determine the priorities of creditors in the
debtor's estate. Contrary to the arguments presented by Professors
Guzman and Rasmussen,35 large differences exist among the bank
ruptcy laws of different countries.36 Several examples illustrate these
differences: (1) The laws of some countries treat a creditor with a
right of set off as secured; the laws of others treat them as unsecured.37
(2) In some countries tort creditors share pro rata with commercial
creditors;38 in other countries, tort creditors are subordinated to com
mercial creditors;39 and in yet others, tort creditors who have not yet
reduced their claims to judgments before bankruptcy do not share at
all.40 (3) In some countries employees are willing to extend substantial
credit to their employers, because they know they will have first pri
ority - ahead of even secured creditors - in the factories in which
they work;41 in other countries such extensions would be foolish be
cause employees' priorities are limited sharply or even nonexistent.42
These differences in legal doctrine occur against even sharper differ
ences in system operation. In some countries, bribery is common. In
others - particularly small nations - the local courts might be under
the corrupt influence of a multinational company based there. Some
countries do not yet have an operating bankruptcy system. If the iden
tity of the home country is arguable or manipulable at the time of
bankruptcy, debtors or their creditors could change both substantive
rights and likely outcomes, simply by their choices of venue.

35. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 4, at 2195 (arguing that the differences among bank
ruptcy regimes' treatment of trade creditors are minor); Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving
Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252, 2273 (2000)
(referring to the differences in treatment of tort creditors by different countries as "mar
ginal").
36. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 709-11.
37. See, e.g., PHILIP R. WOOD, MAPS OF WORLD FINANCIAL LAW 38-43 (3d ed. 1997)
(describing the wide variety of "netting" laws in the countries of the world).
38. This is true, for example, in the United States. See 11 U.S.C. §§502(b) and 726(a)
(1994) (allowing claims and awarding priority without regard to whether the debt is owing
for a tort claim).
39. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF MEXICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 49 (Pre·
liminary Draft No. 3, Aug. 21, 1997).
40. See sources cited in LoPucki, supra note 2, at 709 n.62.
41. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 710-11.
42. Under U.S. law the employees' priority would be limited to wages earned within the
ninety days prior to bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1994). By agreeing to defer
payment without a bankruptcy filing, the employees would be waiving their priority.

June 2000]

Cooperative Territoriality

2225

Second, under universalism, the validity of transfers the debtor
made in the period before bankruptcy would be tested by the laws of
the home country.43 Most national bankruptcy systems have laws pro
viding for the avoidance of various kinds of transfers made by the
debtor in the period before bankruptcy.44 The transfers typically made
avoidable include those that had the effect of preferring one creditor
over another, those made to insiders, and those that had the effect of
reducing an already insolvent estate. But here too, the laws of the
various countries differ widely.45 Without a clear identification of the
debtor's home country in advance, prefiling transfers would be void
able or not, depending on the choice of venue.
Third, under universalism, the courts of debtors' "home countries"
will adjudicate the claims of creditors from all over the world. While
the home country might, under its own conflicts rules, choose to apply
the substantive law of the place where the claim accrued, that is a mat
ter that necessarily would be left to the home country.46 The home
countries presumably would apply their own procedures to the adjudi
cation of the claims - and with them their own notions of due process
of law. Thus, the filing of a bankruptcy in some distant part of a uni
versalist world could deprive an injured person of his or her right to a
trial by jury, to pretrial discovery, or to the effective assistance of
counsel - even though the tort was perpetrated by the debtor in the
United States and the injury occurred in the United States. The dif
ference these changes in "procedure" would make were starkly illus

trated in two recent mass tort cases. What was thought to be $3 billion
in claims against Union Carbide for the deaths of 4,000 people in
Bhopal, India was settled for $470 million when it became apparent
the cases would be tried in India rather than in the United States.47
The recent settlement of breast implant claims in the Dow Coming

43. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 499, 500 (1991) ("[A]n avoiding court in a jurisdiction embracing Modi
fied Universalism should generally apply home-country law."). Westbrook states: "As a
general rule, the avoiding court should apply the home-country avoiding law if it will turn
over the proceeds to the home country court for distribution." Id. Under universalism, only
the second kind of distribution could occur.
44. See id. at 504 ("Most countries seem to have rules that permit the avoidance of
transactions that take place after the inception of a debtor's financial crisis.").

45. See id. at 504-07 (describing the variety of avoidance powers under the laws of vari
ous countries); see also In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996) (in
volving prefiling transfers that were valid under the laws of England but not under the laws
of the United States).
46. This follows from the fact that, in a universalist system, the home country has juris
diction over all of the debtor's assets. Alternatively, universalists could add a complete set
of conflicts rules to the agenda for an international bankruptcy convention.
47. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 809 n.81
(1990) ("Union Carbide ultimately settled all claims by paying $470 million to the Indian
government.").
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bankruptcy expressly gave foreign women lower payments than U.S.
women for the same injuries, on the theory that those injuries were
worth less under foreign procedures.48 If the identity of the home
country were unclear as bankruptcy approached, so would be the val
ues of these claims.

1.

Which Country is the "Home Country"?

Despite the importance of the identity of the home country for any
particular debtor, universalists have been unable to specify meaningful
criteria for its identification. Each of four different bases is plausible.
First, most courts and commentators seem to regard the country of in
corporation as having the strongest claim to home country status.49
For example, more than half of all large public companies filing for
bankruptcy within the United States today file in Delaware rather
than in states where their headquarters, assets, and operations are lo
cated.so They file there on the basis that Delaware is their jurisdiction
of incorporation.s1 Second, companies often are identified with a par
ticular country, because the companies are headquartered in that
country.s2 Third, if substantially all of the employees, operations, and
customers of a large company were in a single country, it is difficult to
imagine that country would not be considered the "home country,"
even if the company's tiny headquarters and place of incorporation
were elsewhere.s3 Fourth, the assets of a company can be almost en-

48. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 747 n.243 (discussing the plan offering foreign women
35-60% of the amounts offered American women for the same injuries).
49. See, e.g., Felixstowe Dock and Ry. Co. v. United States Lines, Inc., 2 All E.R. 77, 93
(Q.B. 1988) (noting that "the English practice is to regard the courts of the country of incor
poration as the principal forum for controlling the winding up of a company"); IAN F.
FLETCHER, THE LAW OF INSOLVEN CY 760-61 (2d ed. 1996); Liza Perkins, A Defense of Pure
Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate Insolvencies, 32 N.Y. J. INT'L L. & POLITICS 787
(2000) {advocating that a company's place of incorporation determines its home country un·
der universalism and criticizing the "principal place of business" or "center or gravity test"
as vulnerable to strategic manipulation).
50. See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967,
985-86 {1999).
51. See id. at 985 n.52 (noting that 89% of the large, public companies that filed for
bankruptcy reorganization in the United States from 1980 to 1997 were incorporated in
Delaware).
52 See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 14, at 2534 (referring to Maxwell as having "its true
'seat' in London, where it was administered and nearly all of its financial affairs . . . were
managed" even though "its principal assets (were] in the United States in the form of various
large operating companies").
53. TV Filme presents a recent example. That company's business is to provide cable
television in Brazil. The headquarters of the company and all of the operations are in Brazil,
but the company raised substantial investments through its holding company parent, which is
incorporated in Delaware and registered with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission.
On this basis, TV Filme filed for reorganization in Delaware. See TV Filme, Inc. Reports
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tirely separate from its operations, as might occur when a company
rents the factories where its employees work, but has substantial land
holdings in another country.
Universalists attempt to dismiss this issue with the assertion that
the identity of the home country will be obvious in most cases.54 But
that rationale contradicts their basic premise of increasing globaliza
tion. No one can deny the existence of a substantial number of multi
national companies whose home countries are either not obvious or in
flux. That number will grow naturally with the increasing globaliza
tion of business. In a prematurely universalist system, that growth
might turn malignant, as financially ailing companies jockey to give
themselves bankruptcy options.
Perhaps responding to the rampant forum shopping within the
United States based on place of incorporation, Guzman and
Westbrook both reject place of incorporation as the standard for
home country.55 Declining to choose from my list of concrete options,
both state a preference for "principal place of business" as the test.5 6
Westbrook defends that choice on the ground that it is a commonplace
standard in American law.57 But he ignores two key facts about his
choice. First, the American courts have been forced to give specific
meaning to the phrase "principal place of business" and have inter
preted it to mean essentially the same thing as "headquarters" - one
of the concrete choices he rejected.58 Second, the "principal place of

Filing Plan of Reorganization, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 26, 2000, at Financial News Section
(noting that the firm's headquarters and operations are in Brazil but that its place of incor
poration and the bankruptcy case are in the United States. ). I doubt many universalists
would assert that the United States is TV Filme's "home country. "

The location of the bulk of a company's assets and operations sometimes has been con
sidered the most appropriate basis for determining its home country for bankruptcy pur
poses. For example, the universalist bankruptcy treaty negotiated (but never implemented )
between the United States and Canada in 1979 used an asset-based test to determine the
country that would havejurisdiction. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 716 n.108.
54. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 4, at '2207 ("[T]here is widespread agreement among
those interested in transnational insolvency that, in the vast majority of cases, the home
country will be easy to identify - making this issue a minor question. "); Ulrik Rammeskow
Bang-Pedersen, Asset Distribution in Transnational Insolvencies: Combining Predictability
and Protection of Local Interests, 73 AM. BANKR. L. J. 385, 418 (1999) ("[I] n most cases de
termination of the home country will be obvious regardless of which standard is used. . . . ").
55. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2207 ("[I] f it is too easy for the debtor to select the
main jurisdiction, it could choose in such a way as to disadvantage strongly nonadjusting
creditors that are likely to interact with the firm . . . . For this reason, a test based on the
place of incorporation would be inappropriate. "); Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2316 ("I agree
that the law of the place of incorporation is unsatisfactory because of the risk of sham incor
poration-: a company organized under a flag of convenience unrelated to the location of its
business, management, and assets. ").
56. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2206-07; Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2316.
57. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2316.
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business" standard was the basis for rampant forum shopping in U.S.
bankruptcies in the 1980s.59
Westbrook also suggests the possibility of a "multidimensional
test" based on some combination of factors. He gives the example of
a presumption based on place of incorporation "rebuttable only by a
clear showing that the center [of the debtor's main interests] was else
where."60 This is the test employed in a model international insol
vency law that Westbrook was instrumental in negotiating.
Westbrook himself has acknowledged in the past that this test will
generate uncertainty:
In those cases where the test does present difficulty, there may well be a
"race of creditors" to have a proceeding opened in a favorable forum.
Not too much has been lost, because creditors have had in any event to

assume that more than one possible forum exists. At least the possible
fora have been limited to those which can fairly assert j urisdiction on the
basis that they are the center of the firm's main interests; that is to say,

1

the test still imposes some limitation on the possible fora . . ..6

In other words, Westbrook admits that a multidimensional test will
not identify a single home country for each debtor.
Westbrook's willingness to accept a home country standard that
merely will narrow the home country of a debtor to one of a few
seems grounded in his acceptance of a false analogy between domestic
and international bankruptcy.62 Westbrook argues that, because use of
such a standard domestically has not led to disaster, use internation
ally will not either.63
The analogy, however, does not hold. Large case bankruptcy is a
substantial industry. Courts compete for cases within the United
States and internationally.64 The effect of having a vague standard for
venue nationally has been to give several courts plausible claims to
particular cases and there is every reason to believe it would do the

58. See generally Lynn�· LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum
Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS.
L. REv. 11 (describing the construction placed on "principal place of business" in American
law and the resulting bankruptcy forum shopping).
59. See id. at 18 (finding that nine of forty-three $100 million companies reorganizing at
their "principal place of business" (21%) had "virtually no property or operations other than
[their) headquarters in the district").
60. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2317. Professor Bang-Pedersen seems to favor that test
as well. See Bang-Pedersen, supra note 54, at 419.
61. Trautman et al., supra note 31, at 582 (emphasis added). It is unclear what, if any·
thing, is governed by the home country text in the model law.
62 See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2309 ("To argue for territoriality as the goal of an
international system is much the same as arguing for state-by-state bankruptcy within the
United States.").
63. See id. at 2316.
64. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 2, at 721.
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same internationally. There the analogy ends. Domestically, a na
tional government and an appellate court system exist to moderate fo
rum shopping and its effects.65 The international realm lacks compa
rable institutions. Internationally, the only limit on outrageous claims
of jurisdiction would be diplomatic protests or wasteful, messy refusals
of cooperation by the courts of other nations. More importantly, ram
pant domestic forum shopping is not a serious problem, because the
bankruptcy law of the United States is a national law that establishes a
national system of priorities.66 Approximately the same rules of distri
bution are applicable regardless of the forum.67 For Westbrook's
analogy between national and international bankruptcy to be sound, a
universalist convention equivalent to the U.S. bankruptcy code and
the uniform laws that govern security interests, fraudulent transfers,
and other subjects within the United States would have to be adopted.
In its absence, international forum shopping would effect huge trans
fers of wealth among the parties to cases.

2.

Is the "Home Country" That of the Entity or the Group?

Multinational companies are almost invariably corporate groups.
Some corporate groups operate a single, indivisible business, such as
an airline. Individual corporations within the group may perform spe
cific functions, such as holding title to aircraft, conducting operations,
or obtaining financing, but none may have a business that could oper
ate apart from the other corporations in the group. Such a group is re
ferred to as having an "integrated" business.68 At the opposite ex
treme, a conglomerate, particularly one that frequently buys and sells
businesses, carefully may avoid any interdependence among the busi
nesses it owns, so that the group could sell any of them without af
fecting the others. Each such business might be owned by a "stand
alone" subsidiary. Most corporate groups probably are somewhere
between these extremes. They operate businesses that are integrated,
to some degree, but that they can, with varying degrees of effort and
expense, separate.
Regardless of how one defines "home country," the home country
of a corporate group often will be different from the home countries
of corporations within the group. For example, assume that Parent
Corporation is a holding company whose only significant assets are its

65. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (1994) (authorizing the district courts to tramfer bank
ruptcy cases "in the interests of justice or for the convenience of the parties").
66. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§506, 726 and 1129(a)(9) (1994).
67. States can grant lien priorities to their local creditors, but only if they meet federal
standards. See 11 U.S.C. §§544(a)-553 (1994).
68. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 719-20 (discussing the integration test as it is applied to
multinational companies by some bankruptcy courts).
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stock holdings in its three subsidiaries. Parent Corporation is incorpo
rated in country P where it maintains its "world headquarters." Each
of the three subsidiaries has its place of incorporation, headquarters,
and operations in each of three countries other than P. P probably
would be considered the home country of the group, but P could not
be considered the home country of any subsidiary.
In which "home country" would the bankruptcy of one or more
members of this corporate group take place? That is, would all file in
the home country of the group? Would each entity file in its own
home country? Or might the home country determination depend on
which corporations were in financial difficulty, which ones filed, or the
degree of integration among them?
No answer to these questions describes a system that could capture
the supposed benefits of universalism. A rule that put the bankruptcy
of each entity in the home country of the entity would split the bank
ruptcy of the group among up to four countries. If the group operated
an integrated business, that would, by the universalists' reasoning,
prevent the reorganization of the business or the liquidation of its as
sets for their best price.69
A rule that put the bankruptcy of the entire group in the home
country of the group would lead to anomalous results and the resulting
system would be manipulated easily. The anomalous results would
occur when only a single, entirely foreign subsidiary was in financial
difficulty. Even if that entity did business only in country A and had
no ties to country P other than ownership by a holding company lo
cated in P, its bankruptcy would take place in P, the home country of
the debtor's group. To illustrate, if the stock of the corporation that
owned Rockefeller Center in New York had been owned by a
Japanese company, the bankruptcy of Rockefeller Center would have
been in Japan, even if the Japanese parent had not been in financial
difficulty.
The manipulation would occur when P either spun off its ailing
subsidiary - to permit it to file in its own home country - or itself
was acquired by another company - to permit any member of the re
sulting group to file jn the acquirer's home country. Recall that each
of these changes would change the law governing the subsidiary's
bankruptcy, including the priorities of creditors.70
The spin off or acquisition that triggered a change in applicable
law in these scenarios would not have to be of any economic signifi
cance. Under the home-country-of-the-group rule, any American
company could give the Cayman Islands jurisdiction over its bank-

69. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2293 ("A single court would improve dramati
cally the possibility of reorganization.").
70. See supra text accompanying notes 3 6-42.
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ruptcy simply by incorporating a holding company there and ex
changing the company's shares for those of the holding company.
That is precisely what Fruit of the Loom - a billion dollar company
- did in preparation for its recent bankruptcy filing.71 Fortunately, in
the current territorial system, that did not give rise to a claim that the
United States should surrender the company's U.S. assets to the
Cayman Islands court. But, under universalism, it would have.
A rule that chose between the home country of the entity and the
home country of the group, depending on the circumstances, would be
highly unpredictable.72 All three factors that might determine the
proper forum and applicable law - the extent of integration, the ex
tent of the financial distress, and which entities filed - would be both
unpredictable and manipulable. Much of the integration within any
corporate group is unintentional. That is, even though prudent busi
ness practices or loan agreements require that a debtor respect the
separation among entities, that debtor fails to do so. As a result, inte
gration is often a matter of degree. The question may not be whether
particular entities could survive on their own, but rather, how much
value would be lost if they had to do so. Those in control of a corpo
rate group can integrate it by having entities in the group guarantee
the obligations of other entities, or by sharing assets such as trade
marks, computer systems, or workforce. They could disintegrate it by
reversing these transactions.
A rule based on the extent of the financial distress within the cor
porate group or on which members of the group filed bankruptcy
would be equally unworkable. Within a few days of the time a bank
ruptcy case is filed in a jurisdiction, it becomes impractical to transfer
the case to another jurisdiction. The case grows roots in the first se
lected jurisdiction as the parties retain counsel or organize committees
in the jurisdiction. The judge devotes considerable time to familiariz
ing him- or herself with the case and makes critical - though some
times tentative - rulings. One of those decisions may be the approval
of new financing that must be disbursed on an emergency basis. Even

71. See Fruit of the Loom, Inc., Form 10-K, at 10 (Fiscal year ending Jan. 2, 1999) ("On
March4, 1999, the Company effected a corporate reorganization pursuant to which Fruit of
the Loom, Ltd., . . . a Cayman Islands company and formerly a subsidiary of the Company,
became the parent holding company of the Company."). Fruit of the Loom's parent com
pany did file in the Cayman Islands, just months after it gained that status. See Chris Mallon,
Chapter 11 Meets Liquidation in the Middle of the Atlantic, GLOBAL TURNAROUND, Feb.
2000, at4.
72. Bang-Pedersen proposes such a solution. See Bang-Pedersen, supra note 54, at 41920. That is, he would make the home country of each entity determinative of the proper
place to file, but make an exception where substantive consolidation was justified by the ap
plicable law and lower the conditions for substantive consolidation in unspecified ways. His
proposal is incomplete because he does not specify the conditions for substantive consolida
tion and hence does not reach the issues of their unpredictability and manipulation. Nor
does he address the problem of what country's law would determine the issue of substantive
consolidation. See infra text accompanying notes 74 and 75.
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within the United States, courts have found it entirely impractical to
uproot a case and transfer it to another jurisdiction.73 An international
move would be immensely more disruptive, even if there were some
way to cause it to occur.
In the early days of many bankruptcy cases, no one but the
debtor's managers know how far financial distress extends within the
group - and, in some cases, not even they know. Hence, any rule
based on the extent of that distress would be vulnerable to mistake,
errors in judgment, or outright manipulation. Once a portion of the
group were lodged in the forum chosen by the debtor, the system
would have no option but to permit the remainder of the group to file
there as well - even if a different country were actually the "home"
of the entire distressed portion of the group.
Bankruptcy filings that extend to only part of the group are the
norm, not the exception. On average, only about a third of the entities
of a corporate group join in its filing.74 It is not at all unusual for some
members of the group to initiate the case and for additional members
to join them later. A rule that looked to the "center of interests" of
the filing members of the group would, �hus, be easily manipulable. A
group could choose its venue by the order in which its members filed.
The issue of corporate groups is further complicated by the fact
that courts sometimes disregard corporate entities or consolidate
them. Thus, even if a universalist scheme deemed each entity to be
located in that entity's home country, the issue of whether a particular
corporation would be treated as an entity for this purpose would re
main. To illustrate, assume that the world has adopted a universalist
system in which each entity is to file bankruptcy in its own home coun
try. Parent Corporation is a Canadian corporation that owns Subsidi
ary Corporation, a Mexican corporation. Each has filed bankruptcy in
its respective country. Creditors wish to assert that the two corpora
tions should be consolidated into one on the ground that assets have
been shuffled between the two and their separate existence is a sham.
Which country's law should govern the issue and in which country's
courts should the matter be litigated? In a universalist system, the in
quiry may be circular: which country's law governs depends upon the

73. See GORDON BERMANT ET AL., CHAPTER 11 VENUE CHOICE BY LARGE PUBLIC
COMPANIES 7 (1997) (noting that "the longer the original district retains [a] case, the more
rational it becomes to retain it"); Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 50, at 999-1001 (ex
plaining and documenting the inadequacy of transfer as a venue correction mechanism);
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 58, at 24 (relaying that "the likelihood of a change of venue
in the . . . cases we studied was small").
74. Examination of data from the bankruptcy cases filed in the United States from 1980
to 1998 by 219 public companies each having more than $200 million in assets reveals that
1 ,868 (32%) of the 5,900 members of the groups joined in the cases. See Lynn M. LoPucki,
Bankruptcy Research Database (database on file with the author).
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home country of the existing entity or entities, but what entity or enti
ties exist may depend on which country's law governs.
Neither Westbrook nor Guzman even attempts to say how a uni
versalist system should fix the location of a multinational company
that is a corporate group. Westbrook claims that the problem is "far
broader than bankruptcy"75 and that "[t]here can be little doubt that
the problem of the legal responsibility of corporate groups will be ad
dressed as the world continues to globalize," and then argues that ter
ritoriality has no better solution.76
In fact, the territorial solution to the problem of corporate groups
is remarkably elegant. It does not rest, as Westbrook claims,77 on an
assumption that all assets within a country are owned by the same
corporation. Rather, it assumes only that each asset is located in some
particular country. The solution is that the law of that country governs
whether the asset is available to satisfy any particular debt, regardless
of the corporate structure and regardless of whether the applicable
body of law is denominated veil piercing, consolidation, agency, sham,
or voodoo. The application of that law will be by the local court, and
it will have no extraterritorial effect.
For example, assume that, in a territorial system, Parent Corpora
tion, which has assets in Canada and Mexico, owns Subsidiary Corpo
ration, which also has assets in both. The Canadian court will deter
mine how many Canadian estates will exist and the Mexican court will
determine how many Mexican estates will exist. Whether their deter
minations are consistent on the issue of whether there is one corpora
tion or two does not matter: each court's determination will apply
only to the assets located in the country.
Both Westbrook and Guzman attempt to undermine the founda
tions of territoriality by asserting that the locations of assets are prob
lematic. That is certainly not true of tangible assets, such as factories,
equipment, and inventory. Westbrook focuses instead on intangible
assets, using the example of a bank account. But even though intangi
ble assets have no physical location in fact, they do, in most cases,
have well-established locations under international law. Westbrook's
example will illustrate:

75. Westbrook, supra note 5, at23 1 1 .
76. Id. at 23 14. Bang- Pedersen makes the same error. See Bang- Pedersen, supra note
54, at 420 n. 13 6 ("This tricky choice of law question will not be analyzed further here, but it
should be noted that territorialism would have to struggle with consolidation choice of law
problems as well, unless it is assumed that substantive consolidation never takes place in a
territorial system. ").
77. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 23 12 ("[Professor LoPucki] assumes a model in
which corporate groups are neatly arranged in national slots. Each country where the group
operates has its own local corporation and all of the assets and liabilities relating to that
country are concentrated in that local corporation."). Westbrook provides no cite in support
of this imputation of claims and I do not recognize them.
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Suppose a bank account in the New York branch of a London bank held
in the name of a Mexican corporation. The traditional, fictional choice
of-law rule would choose New York law as governing, but there is a sub
stantial argument that the worldwide bank has the ultimate obligation to
pay. Thus the New York and English courts would have quite plausible
claims to jurisdiction over the account on those grounds, while the
Mexican bankruptcy court would be following another established doc
trine by asserting jurisdiction over the account by virtue of a worldwide
in rem jurisdiction over all of its debtor's property. As to power, both
New York and London would have contempt power over the bank, while
Mexico could order the debtor's officers to comply under pain of con
tempt. Which court can "claim" the bank account under a territorial sys
tem? All three can do so. The bank and the debtor may well be subject
to conflicting orders.78

Westbrook is correct in his conclusion that all three countries may lay
claim to the account. But the claims of Mexico and England are not
territorial; they are extraterritorial. That is, they are claims to property
located outside the claiming country.79 Under international law, the
bank account in Professor Westbrook's example is located in New
York, because it is in the New York branch of the English bank even if the branch is not separately incorporated.80 In a territorial sys
tem the account would be in the New York estate of the Mexican cor
poration. This result follows not from "de facto power" over the bank
account as Westbrook asserts,81 but from international understandings
regarding the locations of intangible assets worked out over centuries.

3.

What Will Prevent Debtors from Changing Their Home Countries
Opportunistically After Credit Has Been Extended?

Given the huge differences in the bankruptcy laws of the countries
of the world, the incentives to forum shop in a universalist system
would be tremendous. The debtor's managers might want a forum
that would leave them in control of the company during reorganiza-

78. Id. at 2313-14.
79. Charles D. Booth, Recognition ofForeign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of
the Inconsistent Approaches of United States Courts, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 135, 138 (1992)
(describing universalism and then observing that "[t]he contrasting territoriality approach
presumes that a bankruptcy adjudication is limited to the res or property within the jurisdic
tion and does not have extraterritorial effect.").
80. See generally Joseph H. Sommer, Where Is a Bank Account?, 51 MD. L. REV. 1
(1998) (explaining the location of bank accounts). Application of the principle is illustrated
in In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1040-41 (2d Cir. 1996). In that inter
national insolvency case, the court had no difficulty in determining the location of any of the
bank accounts involved.
81. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2308 (asserting wrongly that " 'Cooperative territo
rialism' as proposed by Professor LoPucki in his Cornell article is a system in which each
country exercises jurisdiction over the assets within its de facto power, without regard to le
gal concepts of jurisdiction").
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tion rather than appoint a trustee. They might want one that would
allow them to cram down a plan of reorganization over the objections
of their creditors, or one that would attempt to override regulatory
laws of some of the countries in which the debtor does business. Par
ticular groups of creditors will each want a forum in which the group's
claims will have priority. Because any increase in the priority of one
group of creditors necessarily is accompanied by a corresponding de
crease in the priority of another group, creditor groups will tend to fa
vor different fora.
These differing interests will give rise to conflicting strategies in
the period prior to bankruptcy. A debtor may seek to improve its
claims to an advantageous venue by manipulating the factors relevant
to the venue's test of "home country." Large, public companies fre
quently change their jurisdictions of incorporation, headquarters, and
even operations. For example, Fruit of the Loom is a billion-dollar
bankrupt that recently has been engaged in changing all three.82 In a
universalist system, companies would have greater incentives to do
these things, and so would tend to do them more often. If the home
country of the entity were decisive, debtors could expand their choice
of fora by dissolving or merging subsidiaries; if the home country of
the group were decisive they could acquire or be acquired. If the de
gree of integration mattered, they could change it. Ultimately, they
could place the bankruptcy in any of the countries in which they had
significant contacts.

In a universalist system, creditors might use their leverage over
their debtors to influence the debtors' choice of venue. Contractual
leverage may not, however, be very effective, because the debtor ap
proaching bankruptcy is no longer financially responsible. "Bankrupt
debtors," the adage goes, "may breach their contracts with impunity."
Creditors may try to choose a forum directly by filing an "involuntary"
case against the debtor, but, when they do, they may find themselves
in a race with others who prefer a different forum.83

82. "Fruit of the Loom is based in Chicago, although most of the manufacturing is done
in the West Indies. The business employs 40,000 people worldwide. It was in the process of
relocating its head office from Chicago to Kentucky, and most of its manufacturing out of
the US [sic], when the business entered Chapter 11 at the very end of last year." Mallon,
supra note 71, at 4. The company reincorporated in the Cayman Islands just a few months
before filing one of its bankruptcy cases there. See sources cited supra, note 71.
83. Universalists have not said how the matter should be resolved when the courts of
two or more countries claim worldwide jurisdiction over the property of a multinational
debtor. If they were to adopt the rule applicable within the United States - the court in
which the first filing is made controls venue - parties would race to be the first to file. That
has been the effect of the rule within the United States. See, e.g., LoPucki & Whitford, supra
note 58, at 28 n.60 (describing the race between Baldwin-United and a group of its creditors
to control venue by filing first).
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Bankruptcy forum shopping is already rampant among large com
panies within the United States.84 This is true even though the gains
from it are so subtle that scholars disagree even on what they are.85
U.S. bankruptcy law provides for the transfer of cases on grounds of
forum non conveniens, but courts do not transfer them.86 Instead,
bankruptcy judges in New York, and later Delaware, have sought to
attract cases for the benefit of their local economies.87 The competi
tion among districts for these cases is so intense that even the appel
late courts have been unable to stem it.88
Under the current, mostly territorial, international regime, the
gains from becoming a bankruptcy haven are small. A country can
administer only those assets that are within the country or that other
countries willingly surrender. Nevertheless, forum shopping is already
a significant factor in multinational bankruptcy cases89 and some coun
tries - most notably Bermuda and the Cayman Islands - already are
developing as international bankruptcy havens.90
In a universalist system, the potential gains to host countries from
international forum shopping would be many times greater because all
nations would be required to send the debtor's assets to a single forum
for distribution according to the law of that forum. The benefit to the
forum nation will be in the economic activity it brings to that nation.
In a large bankruptcy case today, the professional fees alone may ex
ceed $100 million.91 Although only a portion of those fees will remain
with professionals in the haven, a haven's cash flow from a series of
84. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 50, at 977-79.
85. See, e.g., id. at 989-91 (detailing an empirical study finding no significant differences
in case processing times between Delaware and all other districts); David A. Skeet, Jr.,
Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1,
28 (1998) (stating that "Delaware has successfully addressed the single biggest problem with
Chapter 11 in recent years - the inordinate time and expense of the reorganization proc
ess").
86. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 50, at 999-1001 (finding that courts returned
only five percent of voluntary cases to the district of the debtor's headquarters).
87. See id. at 983-87 (describing forum shopping to New York and Delaware).
88. See, e.g., id. at 986-87 (describing efforts of the Chief Judge of theUnited States Dis
trict Court in Delaware to moderate forum shopping to that district).
89. See, e.g., Why the Big Restructurings Are Going To Delaware, GLOBAL
TURNAROUND, Apr. 2000 at 6 (quoting U. S. bankruptcy lawyer Keith Shapiro saying that
"[p]eople are forum shopping . . . . TheUK [sic] must change its insolvency laws or lose the
big cross-border restructurings").
90. See, e.g., Mallon, supra note 71, at 4 (noting the recent filing of two billion dollar
cases - ICO, a global satellite company headquartered in England and Fruit of the Loom, a
U. S. company - in the Cayman Islands).
91. See, e.g., Yawar Hanif, BCCI Owners, Liquidators Strike Deal,UNITED PRESS INT'L,
May 14, 1996, available in LEXI S, Wire Service Stories; Joe Ortiz, BCCI Creditors To Get
$2.65 Billion Payment Tuesday, REUTER EURO. Bus. REP., Dec. 9, 1996, available in
LEXI S, Wire Service Stories ("The English liquidators of BCCI, Deloite & Touche
have
been paid a massive $200 million in fees.").
. • .
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such cases may be substantial. Because no international courts of ap
peals exist, the only control on this forum shopping would be the re
fusal of other countries to honor the forum's rulings. Such refusals
probably would be rare, because they would leave the particular
debtor's affairs in chaos. Knowing that, some debtors will claim home
countries boldly.
Creditors may respond to their forum shopping losses by attempt
ing to adjust the terms on which they extend future credit. But their
adjustments will be inadequate,92 and will not be visited on either the
forum shopper or the haven anyway.93 Havens such as the Cayman
Islands and Bermuda will be driven by competition to adopt laws that
seek to systematically exploit involuntary and insufficiently adjusting
creditors, customers, and other stakeholders.
addressed in Section III.B.

4.

How that can occur is

What Jurisdiction Is Ceded to the Home Country?

Under universalism, the court of the home country would have ju
risdiction over the bankruptcy case. But what would be included in
that jurisdiction? Could the court void an otherwise valid collective
bargaining agreement? Relieve the debtor of the burdensome effects
of environmental laws? Suspend the payment of pensions to retired
workers? Risk the pension fund in a reorganization attempt? Delete
from a shopping center lease provisions restricting the purposes for
which the debtor-lessee can use the premises? Will litigation pending
against the debtor at the time of bankruptcy be transferred to the fo
rum country? Each of these issues of bankruptcy jurisdiction has
arisen in the United States and has been resolved.94 The same ques
tions either have been or will be resolved differently in at least some
other countries. If the world adopts a universalist system, whose juris
dictional rules will determine the scope of the home country's powers?

92 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 195458 (1994) (explaining why unsecured creditors under-adjust).
93. Bankruptcy is, for the most part, an end game. Those who control the company at
filing and choose the forum will not control the emerging company. Thus, it would be irra
tional for even adjusting creditors to discriminate against the emerging company on credit
terms. In most cases, the creditors will own the emerging company.
Nor would the haven need to fear that strongly or weakly nonadjusting creditors would
discriminate against borrowers who choose the haven as their home country. Those credi
tors cannot know at the time they lend where the debtor's home country will be at the time
they try to collect.
94. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)(3) (1994) (prohibiting changes in certain provisions of
shopping center leases); 11 U.S.C. §1113 (1994) (detailing the requirements for rejection of
a collective bargaining agreement); 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) (requiring the continued pay
ment of retiree benefits during chapter 11 reorganization); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994) (giving
bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over certain actions and prohibiting them from assuming ju
risdiction over others).
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I cannot imagine that the United States would allow other nations'
bankruptcy systems to override U.S. choices with respect to these
kinds of bankruptcy questions. The answers are too integrally a mat
ter of public policy. For example, imagine that, in the exercise of its
"bankruptcy jurisdiction" in a universalist system, a Brazilian court
authorized a reorganizing Brazilian forest products manufacturer to
continue temporarily in its American operations the use of methods
that violated U.S. environmental laws. I would expect that, in any
universalist bankruptcy convention, the United States and other coun
tries would reserve the right to reject such assertions of jurisdiction. If
that is correct, it will mean that reorganizing a multinational company
in a purely "universalist" system may still require the ex-post approval
of every foreign country involved.95 To put it another way, if bank
ruptcy were to become universalist while the remainder of regulatory
law remained territorial, the system would have to grapple with a new,
problematic interface between the two. In a territorial system, this
problem is much less acute, because the courts that compete for juris
diction are both domestic courts of the same country.
Subject matter jurisdiction is not the only complex new interface
that universalism would create. Economically-minded scholars long
have insisted that the entitlements of a creditor should not change
when a collection case moves from a state forum into a bankruptcy fo
rum.96 One reason is that the change would give legal strategy an even
greater role in determining outcomes.97
The change in entitlements that would occur on the filing of bank
ruptcy in a universalist system would far exceed any that now occurs
domestically. For example, assume that, in a universalist system, a
U.S. bank holds a right of setoff in the funds of the debtor that is the
equivalent of a security interest under U.S. law. Also assume that the
debtor's home country, Luxembourg, treats the holder of a setoff as an
unsecured creditor. If the bank exercises its right of setoff before
bankruptcy, U.S. law will govern and the bank will recover in full. But
if the debtor files bankruptcy before the setoff, Luxembourg law gov
erns and the bank may recover only a few cents on the dollar. Which

95. For example, in a reorganization case, the forum would first decide what reorganiza
tion was preferred and permitted under the law of the forum. Before that reorganization
could be implemented, each other country involved would have to pass on whether it would
recognize the provisions that would have effects in the country not achievable in a reorgani
zation under local law.
96. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A
Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822 (1987) ("Whenever we must have a legal rule
to distribute losses in bankruptcy, we must also have a legal rule that distributes the same
loss outside of bankruptcy. All Jackson and I advocate is that these two rules be the
same.").
97. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Should the Secured Credit Carve Out Apply Only in Bank
ruptcy? A Systems/Strategic Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1483, 1498-509 (1997) (discuss
ing strategies by which parties could defeat a rule that applied only in bankruptcy).
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of these will occur probably will depend on whether the debtor dis
closes its intention to the bank before it files. That, in turn, may de
pend on the relationship between the debtor and the bank. Similar
games could be played with the differences between jurisdictions in
their treatment of security interests, wage claims, or tort claims.98
III. IN DEFENSE OF TERRITORIALITY
Professors Guzman and Rasmussen both assume that three kinds
of creditors represent all who exist.99 In their terminology, "strongly
nonadjusting creditors" are those who are unwilling or unable to ad
just their terms of credit to take account of the risk of nonpayment.
Guzman assumes there are few strongly nonadjusting creditors and
that nearly all of them are tort creditors.100 "Weakly nonadjusting
creditors" extend credit on the same terms to all borrowers in a cate
gory, without regard to differences in the likelihood that the various
borrowers in the category will repay. "Fully adjusting creditors" cal
culate a set of terms specific to the particular borrower.101 The ad
justments made by the latter two groups are perfect, in the sense that
creditors in both groups always get precisely the return they antici
pated.102
Using these assumptions, Guzman proceeds to demonstrate that
the distortion in lending terms under universalism is less than is the
distortion in lending terms under territoriality, and that the adjusting
creditors' costs of acquiring the information they need to fix lending
terms are lower under universalism than under territoriality. Lastly,
Guzman asserts that territoriality is vulnerable to forum shopping
through the international movement of assets. I address each of these
critiques of territoriality separately.
A.

Distortion in Lending Terms from Incomplete Adjustment

The low levels of distortion costs in Guzman's model of univer
salism are the product of two unrealistic aspects of his assumptions.
The first is that nearly all creditors adjust; the second is that each
creditor that adjusts does so perfectly. The first assumption makes the

98. See id.
99. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2182-83 (defining "weakly nonadjusting," and
"strongly nonadjusting" creditors); id. at 2184 (defining "fully adjusting creditor");
Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2266 (opting to apply Guzman's categories).
100. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2182 (appearing to use the terms "nonadjusting" and
"tort" interchangeably).
101. See id. at 2183-84.
102 See, e.g., id. at 2189 ("Notice that, despite the presence of this distortion, weakly
nonadjusting creditors are not 'cheated' in any way. That is, over their full portfolio of
loans, they receive an expected return that is adjusted for the overall risk they face.").
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pool of nonadjusting creditors small so that Guzman can dismiss it as
de minimis.103 The second assumption enables him to ignore the risk
that, in the complex labyrinth of a universalist system, strategically
minded debtors could extract wealth transfers from creditors by sur
prise.
Professor Guzman criticizes the Mexico wage priority example in
which I first made the latter point.104 In my example, Mexican workers
in a universalist system extended too much credit to their U.S. em
ployers because they did not anticipate the application of the less gen
erous priority for wages in U.S. law. Perhaps because miscalculation
by an adjusting creditor is impossible under Guzman's assumptions, he
misinterpreted my concern to be that Mexican values were not hon
ored in the bankruptcy distribution.105 The honoring of national val
ues is, as Guzman points out, merely a zero sum game. But over ex
tension of credit resulting from imperfect adjustment is an issue of
efficiency that Guzman's perfect adjustment assumption causes him to
ignore.
In reality, creditors do not adjust their credit terms perfectly.
Some overestimate and others underestimate the likelihood of repay
ment. The two do not cancel each other out. Debtors tend to borrow
more heavily from those who overestimate (an adverse selection ef
fect). The result is a continuing subsidy from the least sophisticated
creditors to the most opportunistic debtors.106 The magnitude of this
subsidy under a given international bankruptcy system will vary with
the level of deception and error possible in that system.
The level of error and deception would be higher in a universalist
system than in the current territorial one. In a universalist system, a
successful deceit or forum shop could change the law governing the
distribution of the entire estate. Under territoriality, a successful de
ceit or forum shop rarely can affect all of the assets of the debtor com
pany; it would change the law governing only the particular assets in
volved.
The reaction of havens might further increase the possible variance
in outcomes under universalism. That is, under universalism, havens
would compete for cases by adopting laws more favorable to those
who chose the fora for the bankruptcies of multinational companies,
while the laws of other countries remained the same. Because the
stakes would be larger for havens under universalism, their laws would

103. See id. at 2194 (arguing that the amount at stake in the treatment of nonadjusting
debt is small).
104. See id. at 2205-06.
105. See id. at 2206.
106. See LoPucki, supra note 92, at 1954-58.
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become more extreme. That, in turn, would increase deceit and forum
shopping even further.
B.

Information Costs

In Professor Guzman's model, each adjusting creditor seeks full in
formation regarding each of its debtor's creditors and each possibly
applicable bankruptcy law, calculates its return from each possible
bankruptcy proceeding,107 and uses the result to fix its terms of credit.
Because Guzman assumes that, under universalism, the creditors
know the home country whose law will determine the distribution,
while under territoriality the laws of several countries will interact to
determine the distribution, Guzman concludes that creditors' costs of
gathering information to price credit will be greater under territorial
.
8

1ty• 10

In reality, few creditors make the kinds of calculations Guzman de
scribes. Because bankruptcies are relatively uncommon, the size of
the potential return from them is only a small factor in determining
the appropriate rate of interest to charge.109 At the time they extend
credit in the current territorial system, most creditors have only the
dimmest idea of what their debtors' situations would be in some future
bankruptcy. They fix lending rates and terms based on past returns
from similar loans, not on the complex calculations Guzman sup
poses.110 Hence, they have no need for the pieces of data he suggests
they would collect. Because active lenders have experience under ter
ritoriality - the system currently in operation - they already have
the information they need to fix rates and terms. The world would
need considerable experience with universalism to reach the same
level.
C.

Movement ofAssets

Professor Guzman asserts, without argument, that, in a territorial
regime, "[forum shopping] can be accomplished simply by moving as-

107. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2200 (stating the formula for calculating the number
of pieces of information supposedly necessary to price credit).
108. See id.
109. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann , Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt,
96 MICH. L. REV. 159, 239 (1997) ("[I]n practice both involuntary liquidation of collateral
and bankruptcy are quite unusual, even within the relatively small universe of loans that fall
into distress.").
110. See id. at 242 n.343 (quoting a banking executive as saying that a proposal to limit
secured creditors to 80% of their collateral "would have no effect whatsoever on bank
lending" because "loan officers responsible for origination 'don't think or give one hoot
about bankruptcy/workout scenarios. They hope to hell it won't happen. . . . [I]t won't affect
one iota how the banks initiate loans' " (citing a telephone interview with a Bank Division
Manager (Mar. 6, 1997) (brackets in original)).

0
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sets from one jurisdiction to another."111 Such forum shopping does
occur, but has not been a particularly serious problem in the current
territorialist regime. Elsewhere I have described two possible limita
tions on such forum shopping: (1) local legal restrictions and contract
devices that can, and today do, largely prevent such transfers and (2)
treaties or conventions that could provide for the return of fleeing as
sets.112 Professor Westbrook asserts that I consider such treaties or
conventions to be a necessary prerequisite to the operation of a terri
torial regime.113 It should be apparent from what I already have said
that I do not. A territorial regime is already in operation.

IV. RASMUSSEN'S CONTRACTUALISM
A.

The Foundations of Contractualism

Contract is the principal weapon in the economic arsenal. The ar
gument goes as follows: No matter what current conditions obtain in
an economic system, they can be improved by permitting the parties to
enter into contracts. That parties voluntarily agree to the contract
terms, the economist argues, proves that those terms make each better
off than they would have been without them. Because the contract
does not bind third parties, no one is worse off. Thus, every contract is
a net gain for society as a whole and, in the absence of transaction
costs (which economic theorists seem generally content to ignore),
complete freedom to contract optimizes social organization - a condi
tion referred to as "efficiency." No better outcome than that achieved
by contracting is possible; if such an outcome could exist, the econo
mist supposes, the parties would have contracted for it and split the
gain among them.
Economically minded scholars have used contractualism to fight
regulation in virtually every nook and cranny of the economy, from
corporate governance to the family. Regulation, they say, should be
employed only when parties are unable to contract.
Professor Robert Rasmussen was among the first to bring this kind
of contractualism to business bankruptcy. In an article published in
1992, he proposed that any debtor and all of its creditors be permitted
to choose the law that would apply in the event of the debtor's bank
ruptcy.114 They would make the choice from among a "menu" of al
ternatives provided by law. In an article published five years later,

111. Guzman, supra note 4, at 2214.
112 See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 758-59.
113. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 2308.
114. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate
Bankruptcy, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 51 (1992).
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Rasmussen took the idea international.115 Essentially, he proposed
that the "menu" of his earlier proposal be the existing bankruptcy laws
of all the nations of the world.
By this ingenious proposal, Rasmussen seeks to finesse the choice
between universalism and territoriality. No matter what the advan
tages of universalism or territoriality, contractualism is guaranteed to
be at least as good. Even if one of the other systems were best for
every firm (an unlikely possibility), the contracting parties simply
would choose it for every firm. And if, as Rasmussen supposes, which
system is best differs from firm to firm, contractualism would assure
that the parties had the best of both worlds.116

B.

The Trouble with Contractualism

The principal weaknesses of Rasmussen's proposal are the weak
nesses of the contract paradigm itself. First, the benefits of contractu
alism are guaranteed only in the absence of transaction costs,117 yet no
contracting ever takes place in the absence of transaction costs. The
transaction costs of operating under Rasmussen's proposal would be
enormous. Second, the argument for contract only holds so long as
third parties are unaffected; if the scheme permits contracting parties
to bind third parties and extract value from them, the contracting may
no longer have even a tendency toward efficiency. Rasmussen's pro
posal would bind noncontracting parties to the choice of forum, mak
ing it a possible vehicle for third-party exploitation. Third, the con
tract paradigm ignores the possibility that creditors may miscalculate
and that such miscalculations are more likely in some systems than in
others. Rasmussen's proposed system would be so complex in its op
eration that creditors reasonably could not anticipate their treatment.
I consider each of these points separately.

1.

Transaction Costs

A multinational company may have thousands - and at the ex
treme even hundreds of thousands - of creditors, ranging from inter
national banking institutions, to bondholders, trade creditors, employ
ees, and even customers who have advanced down payments or relied
upon warranties. Apparently recognizing that the costs of actually
contracting arp.ong so many parties would be prohibitively expensive,
Professor Rasmussen proposes that debtors note their choice of bank-

115. See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19
MICH. J. lNT'LL. 1 (1997).
116. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2261.
117. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors
Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79, 106-10 (1992).
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ruptcy system in their articles of incorporation.U8 All creditors are as
sumed to have agreed to that choice. Because the circumstances that
make the choice of a bankruptcy system appropriate might change, the
debtor is free to change its election by amending its articles of incor
poration. Rasmussen apparently realizes that sending creditors notice
of the debtor's changes in those elections would also be prohibitively
expensive, and so does not require it. Instead, he would imply the
creditors' consent to a change of election when the change has been
on the public record for a reasonable period of time.119
In the resulting system, creditors could be certain which bank
ruptcy system the debtor elected only if they searched the corporate
records for that information. Under Rasmussen's proposal, the search
would be by entity,120 which might necessitate hundreds of searches in
numerous jurisdictions for a single corporate group.121 To catch
changes in the elections, the creditors would have to repeat their
searches at frequent intervals. Rasmussen notes that the searchers
might employ information brokers of various kinds - such as Dun &
Bradstreet - in the process,122 but Dun & Bradstreet's services are
hardly cheap.123 In even the most optimistic view of those costs, they
would still exceed the cost to the debtors of simply sending each credi
tor notice of each change of election. It follows that Rasmussen must
contemplate that most creditors - the smaller ones - will extend
their credit without actually knowing the debtor's election. Instead of
carefully calculating their return from a bankruptcy filing in the cho
sen jurisdiction or jurisdictions, these small creditors will be flying
blind. The effect is discussed in the next subsection.
Larger creditors can be expected to require that their debtors fur
nish them with notice of changes in the election.124 Knowing that some

118. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2254 ("[C]ontractualism allows each independent
corporate entity to specify in its corporate charter the jurisdiction that will handle any bank
ruptcy proceeding involving that entity.").
119. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2255.
120. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2254 ("[C]ontractualism allows each independent
corporate entity to specify in its corporate charter the jurisdiction that will handle any bank
ruptcy proceeding involving that entity.").
121. The Loewen Group, which recently filed for bankruptcy, has over 1100 subsidiar
ies. See The Loewen Group, Inc., Form 10-K, at Ex. 21 (Fiscal year ending Dec. 31, 1998)
(listing the subsidiaries).
122 See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2266. What Rasmussen posits in this passage is
the economists' dream of a world of perfect information and zero transaction costs. I readily
concede that his proposal would work perfectly in that world, but so would every competing
proposal. See LoPucki, supra note 117, at 106-10.
123. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, INFORMATION LAW: A SYSTE M S APPROACH 216 (2000)
(detailing a price schedule for Dun & Bradstreet subscribers showing prices for reports
ranging from $9.33 to $693.32).
124. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2261. ("The firm borrowing the money will simply
show the lender the relevant provision in its corporate charter.").
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will fail to comply with the requirement, they will also conduct
searches. Each search is likely to require some analysis. Recall that
the election is not necessarily for the law of any particular country. It
may be an election for territoriality or some other combination of sys
tems.125 Thus, for every debtor in the world - multinational or not numerous creditors would have to conduct frequent searches and
analyze the results. That analysis might require familiarity with any or every - one of the bankruptcy systems of the approximately 268
countries of the world.126 In short, the costs of contracting would be
enormous.
Rasmussen responds that the negotiations among estate represen
tatives in a territorial system would be both expensive and uncertain in
outcome and that as a result "the costs of cooperative territorialism
7
may well exceed those of a bankruptcy selection clause regime. "12
That is, however, unlikely.

In

a territorial regime, negotiation costs

are incurred only for the firms that file bankruptcy, only once for each
bankruptcy, and only by each of two, or a few, estate representatives.
In a contractualist regime, negotiation costs are incurred for all firms,
they are continuous over the life of each firm, and they are incurred by
every adjusting creditor of those firms individually.

2.

Externalizing Costs

As noted in the preceding subsection, most creditors will not find it
cost-effective to monitor the debtor's election. These creditors must
either decline to deal with the debtor (and thus, presumably, with all
debtors) or attempt to guess the appropriate terms. To protect against
their debtors' opportunism, they should guess that their debtor will
choose the most exploitative bankruptcy alternative available, and
price their credit accordingly. Given that they would be charged as
though they made that choice anyway, debtors would then have to
choose the most exploitative alternative available to break even.
Recent experience with asset protection trusts suggests that off
shore havens will tailor their laws to provide extremely exploitative
alternatives. In the past two decades, about a dozen haven countries

125. See supra text accompanying note 116. Rasmussen defends his contractualist ap
proach by analogizing it to generally enforceable "forum selection clauses and choice of law
clauses" in contracts. See Rasmussen, supra note 115, at 5 ("Private international law gen
erally recognizes the validity of forum-selection clauses and choice of law clauses in private
contracts. This principle of contractual choice should be extended to insolvency matters.").
There is, however, an important difference. The parties bound by the latter contracts typi
cally have actual notice of the provisions.
126. As of February 28, 2000, The CIA Factbook listed 268 countries in the world. See
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (visited Feb. 28, 2000) <http://www.odci.
gov/cia/publications/factbook/country.htrnl>.
127. Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2263.
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have adopted asset protection trust laws that are specifically designed
to prevent foreign creditors from collecting debts owing from anyone
who avails him or herself of the haven's services.128 The havens do so
by validating self-settled spendthrift trusts. These trusts are, in es
sence, merely declarations by debtors that their assets should be avail
able to themselves, but not to their creditors. These countries protect
the assets in the care of their nationals by refusing to recognize foreign
judgments, by making the trusts virtually impossible to break, and by
recognizing the right of the trustee to move the assets to a different
haven in the event that any creditor is foolish enough to attack in the
courts of the originally designated haven.129 The existence of these as
set protection trust laws demonstrate the willingness of a significant
number of countries to enact and enforce laws for the purpose of frus
trating debt collection, and to do so for the benefit of anyone capable
of bringing substantial foreign business to the haven. Thus, I would
expect that, under a contractualist regime, debtors and their major
creditors would join in electing to conduct any necessary bankruptcy
proceedings in havens that would offer to exploit the other creditors
for their benefit. The havens' reward would be the same as with asset
protection trusts - the fees that the havens and their citizens could
charge for their services.
Rasmussen expresses doubt that the havens effectively could "tar
get incompletely-adjusting creditors for appropriation" without also
harming fully adjusting creditors.13° But there are numerous ways the
havens could do that, even without going outside the bounds of the
current bankruptcy practices in industrialized nations. First, the ha
vens could disallow the claims of particular types of creditors that are
unlikely to adjust. That might include all unliquidated tort claims; as
is apparently the law of Spain today.131 Alternatively, the haven could
disallow all foreign government claims for taxes; that is the bankruptcy
law of most countries today.132

128. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 32-34 (1996) (de
scribing the laws).
129. See id. at 36.
130. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2267 ("Thus, even if the amount of weakly
nonadjusting creditors is large, it is far from certain that bankruptcy laws can be targeted so
as to transfer value from weakly adjusting creditors to debtors on the one hand, while at the
same time not to transfer such value from fully adjusting creditors on the other.").
131. See, e.g., In re Papeleras Reunidas, 92 B.R. 584, 591 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Spanish law
classifies judgment lien creditors as general unsecured creditors while United States law
generally classifies such lien creditors as secured creditors up to the value of the properties
to which the liens attach . . . . ) .
"

132 See NATIONAL BANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY
YEARS 364-65 (1997) (recommending that development of the law in this area be left to
treaty negotiators and courts); PIIlLIP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY § 1-54, at 30 (1995) ("Many jurisdictions do not permit the claims of foreign
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Second, the haven could impose minor costs and other procedural
barriers to participation in the case. That would target essentially
those contract creditors who would not adjust to their exclusion from
the distribution. For example, imposing a filing fee for making a claim
would tend to make claiming not cost effective for those with the
smallest claims. They are the creditors who would be least likely to
take account of whether their future extensions of credit were to debt
ors who had elected the haven as their forum. Placing the expense of
operating a creditors' committee on the creditors rather than on the
debtor's estate would have much the same effect.133 Over time, the
haven might fine-tune these kinds of burdens so that the creditors
without enough at stake to pursue their claims would be precisely the
same creditors that did not have enough at stake to adjust their credit
terms to avoid repeated exploitation in the future.
A third possibility for targeting small contract creditors would be
for the haven to permit the debtor and a simple majority in dollar
amount of its creditors (usually just one or two creditors) to impose a
plan of reorganization or liquidation on the minority.134
Rasmussen attempts to compare "the benefits that can be achieved
by selecting the most efficient insolvency law" with the "benefits that
could be garnered by subordinating the claims of tort victims."135 But,
in doing so, he misses the point in four respects. First, the range of
creditors vulnerable to attack includes not just tort creditors but also
trade creditors, employees, customers, taxing authorities, retirees, per
sons with any kind of litigation pending against the debtor, and many
others. Second, bankruptcy regimes need not, as Rasmussen asserts,
sacrifice the flexibility of contract to assure the compensation of tort
creditors. In a territorial regime, the estate representatives and the
parties remain free to contract around inefficiencies; they simply can
not contract around the obligation to compensate tort creditors136 as
they could in a contractualist regime. Third, the loss from failure to
compensate tort creditors is not limited to the currently existing
amount of tort liability. There is profit in torts such as patent inrevenue authorities or foreign penal demands."); Westbrook, supra note 19, at 37-38 (dis
cussing the disallowance of foreign government tax claims in insolvency proceedings).
133. This is currently tlie law of Canada. See Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A
Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed
Companies, 35 HARV. lNT'LL.J. 267, 335 (1994).
134. This could be accomplished by autliorizing tliem to ignore tlie nonbankruptcy enti
tlements of the other creditors or by permitting the majority to impose a plan by voting that
discriminates against tlie minority of voters.
135. Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2271.
136. The representatives are fiduciaries for all persons having an interest in tlie estate.

See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 462 n.8 (6th Cir. 1982) ("A trustee

in bankruptcy or a debtor in possession, as a fiduciary, represents botli tlie secured and un
secured creditors of tlie debtor.").
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fringement, tortious interference with contractual relations, and fraud.
If tortfeasors need not pay for their torts, they will commit more of
them and we have no reliable way of calculating how many more.137
Last, Rasmussen assumes that the savings to the debtor from filing in
an anti-tort haven is limited to the excess of the tort debt over the
debtor's insurance.138 But in a world where debtors could opt out of
tort liability simply by choosing an anti-tort haven's bankruptcy re
gime, debtors would have little incentive to buy liability insurance.139
Realizing the threat that externalization poses to contractualism,
Rasmussen would require that the "bankruptcy regime selected by a
firm accord at least nominal priority to tort victims similar to what
they achieve in their home country"140 and permit any country to en
force it by refusing to enforce a forum-selection clause "as applied to
the involuntary creditor."141 Despite my prodding,142 Rasmussen does
not say how the country refusing to enforce would give effect to its de
cision. I can see only a single way: by asserting territorial j urisdiction
over the assets within its borders in favor of the involuntary creditor.
By this move, Rasmussen would make his contractualism merely a su
perstructure on a territorial base,143 and open a can of worms over
which I have already gagged elsewhere.144

3.

Wrongly Adjusting Creditors

Both Rasmussen and Guzman assert that a debtor and its maj or
creditors can gain nothing through the exploitation of contract credi-

137. On this basis, I challenge Rasmussen's statement that "the gains generated by low
ering priority only occur in cases with substantial tort liability." Rasmussen, supra note 35,
at 2271. In fact, the corporation frees itself from the deterrent effect of tort liability as soon
as it elects an anti-tort bankruptcy haven.
138. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2269 ("In most situations, firms will have insur
ance sufficient to cover the claims of the few tort victims it may have. . . . Thus, when ade
quate insurance exists, tort creditors are compensated in full despite the nominal low priority
that their claims receive in bankruptcy.").
139. See LoPucki, supra note 128, at 76-79 (discussing the incentives to buy liability insurance).

140.

Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2271.

141.

Rasmussen, supra note

115, at 35.

142 See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 740-42.
143. As further evidence of this territorial base to Rasmussen's contractualist super
structure, Rasmussen also finds it necessary to permit "a domestic court to ignore the edicts
of a foreign jurisdiction" if the foreign jurisdiction failed to recognize "property rights" such
as a lien or security interest granted to a local creditor by the domestic country. Rasmussen,
supra note 35, at 2275. This grant of authority effectively allows each nation to decide who
gets the assets located within the nation (territoriality), leaving only those assets unspoken
for to be distributed by the law of the selected forum (contractualism).
144. See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 740-42.
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tors.145 Guzman reaches that conclusion by positing a universe of
three kinds of creditors, none of whom ever lose money as a result of
miscalculation or deceit; all creditors who adjust at all charge enough
for the credit they extend that on the average they lose nothing.146
Rasmussen realizes the implausibility of Guzman's assumption and
recognizes the possibility that debtors can extract value from weakly
nonadjusting credhors.147 But, by assuming that category of creditors
will "shrink dramatically" as a result of future improvement in private
markets for information, he still manages to join in Guzman's conclusion.148
In reality, miscalculating creditors are ubiquitous. They range
from banks that lend on the basis of false financial statements, to
bondholders who trade on inadequate or incorrect information, trade
creditors who take unwarranted risks in the hopes of increasing sales,
and employees or customers who never consider the possibility that
they will be creditors at all. None of these types of creditors is likely
to disappear as a result of improvements in information markets.
·

When these creditors suffer losses, they cannot recoup them by
charging someone else above-market rates. The market rate is, by
definition, the highest rate creditors can charge and still have custom
ers.
Creditors that miscalculate too often may indeed be forced out of
business and replaced by others who can be fooled less often. But, as I
have explained elsewhere, normal turnovers of people and firms will
generate a continuous subsidy to those debtors capable of exploiting
them.149 When the incentives established in a legal system are poor, an
entire industry systematically can miscalculate, producing gigantic, un
recoverable losses. Such was the case with the Savings and Loan crisis
of the 1980s, in which those institutions suffered losses in excess of

145. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2189 ("Notice that despite the presence of this distor
tion, weakly nonadjusting creditors are not 'cheated' in any way. That is, over their full port
folio of loans, they receive an expected return that is adjusted for the overall risk they
face."); Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2265 ("Professor Guzman also demonstrates that
weakly nonadjusting creditors cannot be systematically disadvantaged by any given bank
ruptcy regime. Regardless of the regime, they will be able to price their so loans so as to ob
tain a market rate of return.").
146.

See Guzman, supra note 4, at 2180-81.

147. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2266 ("Thus, the dominant strategy for all debtors
is to select a bankruptcy regime that transfers value to debtors from weakly nonadjusting
creditors.").
148. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 2267 ("In light of these observations, the concern
over debtor havens must be a concern about the exploitation of strongly nonadjusting credi
tors.").
149.

See LoPucki, supra note 92, at 1954-58.
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$500 billion on loans.150 Such may also have been the case with recent
forum shopping to Delaware in bankruptcy reorganization cases.151
The best systems for economic organization are simple and intui
tive. Territoriality fits that description; contract choice does not. By
contrast, contract choice would reward strategic activity by countries,
by debtors, and by their major creditors. That activity would be most
intense in the period shortly before bankruptcy, when the probability
of bankruptcy was high.152 Whether the strategies involved were legal
or illegal would matter little in the outcome. Each time an adjusting
creditor was surprised by the harshness of its treatment under the law
of a bankruptcy haven, the economic loss would be real and unrecov
erable. A contract choice system would generate some tendency to
ward efficiency, but it might generate a more powerful tendency to
ward exploitation.
The problems with Rasmussen's contract choice result largely from
the fact that the parties must incur the expense and go to the trouble
of contracting regarding bankruptcy at a time when bankruptcy is only
a remote possibility.153 Because so few borrowers actually will file
bankruptcy, the difference in creditors' expected recoveries resulting
from different bankruptcy regimes is likely to be less than the transac
tion costs necessary to contract for those recoveries.154 Territoriality
offers the same parties the opportunity to contract regarding bank
ruptcy only in the cases that reach bankruptcy. That is the context in
which bankruptcy contracting is most likely to succeed.
V.

CONCLUSION

This round of essays made substantial progress in the international
bankruptcy debate. As to Rasmussen's contractualism, the analysis
frames essentially three issues. The first is whether future develop
ments in information systems will make possible the transmission of a
debtor's choice of bankruptcy regimes to, and analysis of that choice
by, thousands of individual creditors. The second is the extent to

150. See generally STEPHEN PIZZO ET AL., INSID E JOB: THE LOOTING OF AMERICA 'S
SAVINGS AND LOANS (1989).
151. See Sara D. Kalin & Lynn M. LoPucki, The Failure ofPublic Company Bankrttpt
York: Empirical Evidence ofa "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2001) (showing failure rates for Delaware reorganizations of up to seven
times the failure rates in U.S. jurisdictions other than Delaware and New York City).

cies in Delaware and New

152 See supra Section II.B.3.
153. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, Contract Bankrttptcy: A Reply to Alan Sclnvartz,
109 YALE LJ. 317 (1999) (refuting a bankruptcy contracting proposal).
154. Only about one-half of one percent of publicly held companies file for bankruptcy
in a given year. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 18 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 608 n.43
(1993) (calculating the rate).
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which bankruptcy systems can target for exploitation creditors who do
not completely adjust. The third is whether the gains to be had from
the exploitation of those creditors are sufficiently large that the system
will pursue them at the expense of efficiency. In my opinion, contrac
tualism is likely to fall short in all three areas.
As to universalism, this exchange highlights the fact that it is no
longer a single proposal, but is now a multitude of them. That multi
tude includes the adoption of a world-wide law governing debtor
creditors relations and the establishment of a system of international
bankruptcy courts as well as the traditionally universalist idea that the
court of the debtor's home country would administer the worldwide
assets of the debtor according to the law of that home country.
Westbrook and I agree that traditional universalism would present
no great problem in a world in which the bankruptcy and priority laws
of all countries were essentially the same. We disagree on whether an
international convention could establish a traditionally universalist
system without first eliminating the sharp differences that exist among
the bankruptcy systems of the various countries. As I see it, the re
sults of such a premature attempt at universalism would be rampant
forum shopping by multinational companies and their financiers for
favorable systems and the rise of offshore bankruptcy havens that
would specialize in providing such systems. Choosing universalism
prematurely may be choosing, in effect, to have most multinational
bankruptcies take place in secret in Bermuda or the Cayman Islands
- under laws made by the legislatures of those countries.
Assuming I am correct in that analysis, the universalist guerillas
who exhort bankruptcy judges to surrender local assets today to
"home country" courts that will distribute them differently inject un
certainty and injustice without advancing the cause of reform. Bank
ruptcy professionals, including bankruptcy judges, understandably
look forward to the time in which they will be free of sovereign power.
But, if they are not more cautious, they may destroy the territorial sys
tem in which they now practice before the foundations of a viable new
system are in place.

